Research Notes / Notes Research

An experiment in note-taking, Spring 2008.
Mar 30
Permalink

"Infrastructure studies" and collective action: a general orientation and some project ideas

In “Experience and abstraction: the arts and the logic of machines,” Simon Penny highlights a tension between critical arts practice and the logics and rhetorics underlying and embedded within the technologies that are sometimes (indeed explicitly, in the case of digital arts) used to give voice to the critiques offered by arts practice. He writes:

Much of my writing has grappled with issues which I find fundamental to the formation of art-practices which exploit the capabilities of emerging technologies (often but not always, involving real time digital computation). These theoretical inquiries arise out of pragmatic attempts to apply these technologies to artistic practice. (p. 1)

I wish to argue that the tension is no longer (if indeed it ever was) restricted to digital arts practice. As the simultaneous projects of instrumental rationalization and economic globalization continue apace, anybody with ethical commitments of any sort outside the canonical neoclassical commitment to personal utility maximization must confront and negotiate this in the course of everyday life—in, if you like, the daily practice of living within a technocapitalist society. I wish to highlight one specific recurring problem that faces individuals with such commitments, which is that opting out of systems which compromise ethical commitments is often non-viable; that is, to opt out is not strictly impossible, but it is impossible if we wish to remain viable (and perhaps even activist) participants in society.

I will give some concrete examples:

  • I have worked in climate research and as an activist around ‘sustainability’ for a number of years, and am acutely aware of the climate-destabilizing impacts of carbon dioxide emissions (and the disproportionate effects of these impacts on the global poor); yet I still drive a car that gets 33 MPG on a good day.
  • I am further aware of the climate-destabilizing and environmentally degrading impacts of suburban architecture and landscape design; yet I live in a large house with a large lawn.
  • I am aware of some labor exploitation issues; yet I still wear commodity clothing and use commodity electronics produced in far-away countries under questionable labor conditions. (These practices are also obviously significantly problematic environmentally, both locally and for global climate stability.)
  • I am highly supportive of the free software ideology, but I use a computer with a proprietary operating system.

The typical response to these concerns is that they are “not my problem;” they are outside the scope of my work; I am supporting climate activists by giving a dollar to CALPIRG or Al Gore; I am spending my time or money on other things right now; or “whatever” (Haugeland, Having Thought, p. 225). This is understandable given that we find ourselves living in a technocapitalist society governed generally by neoclassical economic principles, and specifically given the importance of comparative advantage in the neoclassical approach to political economy. The widespread adoption of this attitude has contributed significantly to the professionalization of activism. This has led, in turn, to the logistical inability of activists to confront one of the issues underlying a great many of the issues they ostensibly seek to address, which is the broad extension of the logic of comparative advantage to encompass nearly all aspects of social organization. This extension has led to a situation in which it is often prohibitively difficult for groups of individuals with ethical commitments that would incline them to opt out of existing infrastructures to do so while remaining viable or credible actors in society at large. The ironic genius of proponents of the market economy has been to glorify the effects of competition (between firms, individuals, ideas, and so on) within the neoclassical framework while repudiating the possibility that there could ever be any viable competition to that framework. ‘Intentional communities,’ anarchist communes, survivalists, and others who abstain, for whatever reason, from participation in the market economy are made pariahs. Generally speaking, capital (or the promise of capital) remains the only viable mode for organizing sustained large-scale collective action, and because participation in the market economy (like participation in a Web 2.0 application) is a network good (i.e., utility to individual users scales with the number of total users), the ‘operators’ of that economy have strong incentives to maintain this state of affairs.

My general theoretical orientation is toward a critical study of infrastructure. Bogost and Montfort, in their call for a critical study of “platforms,” describe their object of study as follows:

The hardware and software framework that supports other programs is referred to in computing as a platform. A platform in its purest form is an abstraction, simply a standard or specification. To be used by people and to take part in our culture directly, a platform must manifest itself materially. This can be done in the chips, casings, peripherals, and other components that make up the hardware of a physical computer system. A platform may also include an operating system. It is often useful to see a programming language or environment on top of an operating system as a platform, too. Whatever the programmer takes for granted when developing, and whatever, from another side, the user is required to have working in order to use particular software, is the platform. In general, platforms are layered—from hardware through operating system and into other software layers—and they relate to modular components, such as optional controllers and cards. Studies in computer science and engineering have addressed the question of how platforms are best developed. Studies in new media have addressed the cultural relevance of particular software that runs on platforms. But little work has been done on how the hardware and software of platforms influences, facilitates, or constrains particular forms of computational expression. (Bogost and Montfort, “New Media as material constraint: an introduction to platform studies,” p. 1)

Even within the less traditional branches of economics and law, the term “infrastructure” resists crisp definition (see e.g., Frischmann, “An economic theory of infrastructure and commons management,” pp. 924-933, in Minn. L. Rev. 89, pp. 917-1030). Like Bogost and Montfort’s “platform,” however, infrastructure:

  • can be described generally as those systems that support the activity of other systems,
  • is “in its purest form an abstraction, simply a standard or specification,” but must be materially manifested to “be used by people and take part in our culture directly” (Bogost and Montfort, p. 1) [here however the definition of ‘material’ may benefit from some clarification, as in social or cultural infrastructures the extent of this material manifestation may be as spoken words or even bodily gestures],
  • is “take[n] for granted” when engaged in other activities that rely on it (Bogost and Montfort, p. 1), and
  • is “layered” (or nested) and “modular” (Bogost and Montfort, p. 1).

I have already suggested some infrastructures (specifically some that I might be interested in modifying or opting out of owing to conflicting ethical commitments): the car-and-road transportation infrastructure; the suburban housing infrastructure; the early-21st-century globalized economy; and Apple’s OS X, which I run on my laptop. (Indeed the last of these is also a “platform” as Bogost and Montfort define the term, suggesting that the class of things that are “platforms” might fall within the class of things [or systems] that are “infrastructure.”) Additional examples include university bureaucracies (one piece of which—the piece, incidentally, which intersects with the car-and-road transportation infrastructure—I have written about at some length in “The winter of parking dangerously”); the internet; the plumbing in my bathroom; and the system of representative democracy in the United States.

Beyond a general interest in a humanistic, ethical, and political critique of infrastructures—especially the infrastructures upon which we rely in our everyday lives—I am interested specifically in efforts to mobilize collective action in service of analyzing existing infrastructures and the problems which they purport to solve, modifying existing infrastructures, and constructing new (“alternative”) infrastructures. Generally speaking I believe we must move beyond the traditional critical artistic strategy of ‘intervening’ into various ‘discourses’. The relevant discourses are by and large (1) highly dispersed and therefore not susceptible to localized intervention; (2) beyond repair; or (3) nonexistent. For a critical infrastructure practice to be viable, I would suggest that in addition to (or perhaps even instead of) being an ‘intervention’ of the traditional flavor it should seek to create—or at least point toward the creation of—new infrastructures or infrastructure practices that attempt to address the flaws being highlighted in existing infrastructures and practices.

I have some (generally, I expect, pretty bad) ideas for projects that explore this space:

  • Aldrich Park camp-in: against the Irvine Company’s housing monopoly, environmentally disastrous low-density design, and the compartmentalization and alienation of suburban housing; toward community, density, low-impact housing; and DIY infrastructure (specifically Rudofsky’s “non-pedigreed architecture”)
  • A place-based, grad-undergrad “collective intelligence”: subverting rhetorics of competition in the academic context (“extreme study group”); toward deliberative democracy, cooperation, and interdisciplinarity (cf. “coworking” movement)
  • Networked collective intelligence for open issues (i.e., ‘open problems’ and ‘unframed issues’; see ‘Beyond solved problems’): can networked publics ‘solve’ real ‘problems’? Toward interdisciplinarity, deliberation, and cooperation
  • Against the Apple aesthetic; beyond wearable computing; toward a plurality of DIY information infrastructure fashions: constructing a flexible, extensible, “visible” cyborg system for nomadic infrastructure practice
  • Network for secession research and experimental political economy: a networked collective intelligence toward imagining postnational/bioregional/hyperlocal futures (framed as ARG? cf. “World Without Oil”)
Mar 29
Permalink

Summary: intelligence is not separable from the world

If we are to understand mind as the locus of intelligence, we cannot follow Descartes in regarding it as separable in principle from the body and the world. I have argued that such separability would haveto coincide with narrow-bandwidth interfaces, among the interactions that are relevant to intelligence. In recent decades, a commitment to understanding intelligence as rational problem solving—sometimes assumed a priori—has supported the existence of these interfaces by identifying them with transducers. Broader approaches, freed of that prejudicial commitment, can look again at perception and action, at skillful involvement with public equipment and social organization, and see not principled separation but all sorts of close coupling and functional unity. As our ability to cope with the absent and covert, human intelligence abides in the meaningful—which, far from being restricted to representations, extends to the entire human world. Mind, therefore, is not incidentally but intimately embodied and intimately embedded in its world.

—Haugeland, J., 2000: Mind Embodied and Embedded, p. 30-31 (Part 17, “Conclusion”). Chapter 9 in Haugeland, J., 2000: Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. Harvard University Press.

author:haugeland-john book:haugeland-having-thought paper:haugeland-mind-embodied-and-embedded snip:summary-intelligence-is-not-separable intelligence embodied infrastructure interaction intimacy complexity embodiment embedded embeddedness semiotics culture practices custom sociology order organization society network list:mind-body-world type:summary

Permalink

The intelligence of institutions

the structure of an institution is implemented in the high-bandwidth intelligent interactions among individuals, as well as between individuals and their paraphernalia. Furthermore, the expertise of those individuals could not be what it is apart from their participation in that structure. Consequently, the intelligence of each is itself intelligible only in terms of their higher unity.

—Haugeland, J., 2000: Mind Embodied and Embedded, p. 30. Chapter 9 in Haugeland, J., 2000: Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. Harvard University Press.

author:haugeland-john book:haugeland-having-thought paper:haugeland-mind-embodied-and-embedded snip:intelligence-of-institutions intelligence collective-intelligence embodied infrastructure interaction intimacy complexity embodiment embedded embeddedness semiotics culture practices custom sociology order organization society network list:mind-body-world

Permalink

Not all of structure of intelligence is external, but some of it is...

…the point: it’s not that all of the structure of intelligence is “external”, but only that some of it is, in a way that is integral to the rest.

—Haugeland, J., 2000: Mind Embodied and Embedded, p. 29. Chapter 9 in Haugeland, J., 2000: Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. Harvard University Press.

author:haugeland-john book:haugeland-having-thought paper:haugeland-mind-embodied-and-embedded snip:some-intelligence-is-external intelligence embodied infrastructure interaction intimacy complexity embodiment embedded embeddedness semiotics list:mind-body-world

Permalink

Embodied/embedded intelligence: getting to San-Jose

Consider the ability to get to San Jose. That’s a capacity to deal with something out of view—a distant city—and so just what is characteristic of intelligence. Moreover, a cognitive scientist will instinctively attribute it to some sort of representation, either an internal or external map or set of instructions, which an intelligent system either consists in or can consult and follow. But that’s not the only way to achieve the effect. A quite different approach would be to keep a stable of horses, one pre-trained for each likely destination. Then all that the capable person would need to do is pick the right horse, stay on it, and get off at the end. Here we’re inclined to say that it’s the horse that knows the way, not the rider—or maybe that the full ability is really collaborative, say like Gilbert and Sullivan’s. At any rate, the horse’s contribution is not to be ignored.

Now let me tell you how I get to San Jose: I pick the right road (Interstate 880 south), stay on it, and get off at the end. Can we say that the road knows the way to San Jose, or perhaps that the road and I collaborate? I don’t think this is as crazy as it may first sound. The complexity of the road (its shape) is comparable to that of the task and highly specific thereto; moreover, staying on the road requires constant high-bandwidth interaction with this very complexity. In other words, the internal guidance systems and the road itself must be closely coupled, in part because much of the “information” upon which the ability depends is “encoded” in the road. Thus, much as an internal map or program, learned and stored in memory, would (pace Simon) have to be deemed part of an intelligent system that used it to get to San Jose, so I suggest the road should be considered integral to my ability.

—Haugeland, J., 2000: Mind Embodied and Embedded, p. 28. Chapter 9 in Haugeland, J., 2000: Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. Harvard University Press.

author:haugeland-john book:haugeland-having-thought paper:haugeland-mind-embodied-and-embedded snip:getting-to-san-jose intelligence embodied infrastructure road interaction intimacy complexity embodiment embedded embeddedness semiotics list:mind-body-world

Permalink

Things meaningful in themselves

When cognitive scientists and philosophers speak of meaningful inner entities, they always mean representations (nothing other than representations has ever been proposed as inner and meaningful). Descartes, in effect, invented the “inner realm” as a repository for cognitive representations—above all, representations of what’s outside of it—and cognitive science hasn’t really changed that at all.

But when Dreyfus holds that meaningful objects are the world itself, he doesn’t just (or even mostly) mean representations. The world can’t be representation “all the way down”. But that’s not to say that it can’t all be meaningful, because there are more kinds of significance than representational content. A number of philosophers earlier in the twentieth century—Dewey, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Merleau-Ponty, to name a few of the most prominent—have made much of the significance of equipment, public places, community practices, and the like. A hammer, for instance, is significant beyond itself in terms of what it’s for: driving nails into wood, by being wielded in a certain way, in order to build something, and so on. The nails, the wood, the project, and the carpenter him or herself, are likewise caught up in this “web of significance”, in their respective ways. These are the meaningful objects that are the world itself; and none of them is a representation.

—Haugeland, J., 2000: Mind Embodied and Embedded, p. 27. Chapter 9 in Haugeland, J., 2000: Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. Harvard University Press.

author:dreyfus-hubert book:dreyfus-what-computers-can’t-do author:haugeland-john book:haugeland-having-thought paper:haugeland-mind-embodied-and-embedded snip:things-meaningful-in-themselves things world meaning meaningful representation critique model significance semiotics list:mind-body-world

Permalink

The world itself as meaningful

When we are at home in the world, the meaningful objects embedded in their context of references among which we live are not a model of the world stored in our mind or brain: they are the world itself. (Dreyfus, 265–266)

There are really several (closely related) points being made in this dense and powerful sentence. First, there is, so to speak, the locus of the meaningful; second its character; and third, our situation with regard to it. The meaningful is not in our mind or brain, but is instead essentially worldly. The meaningful is not a model—that is, it’s not representational—but is instead objects embedded in their context of references. And we do not store the meaningful inside of ourselves, but rather live and are at home in it. These are all summed up in the slogan that the meaningful is the world itself.

—Haugeland, J., 2000: Mind Embodied and Embedded, p. 25. Chapter 9 in Haugeland, J., 2000: Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. Harvard University Press. (Citing Dreyfus, H. L., 1972/79: What Computers Can’t Do).

author:dreyfus-hubert book:dreyfus-what-computers-can’t-do author:haugeland-john book:haugeland-having-thought paper:haugeland-mind-embodied-and-embedded snip:world-itself-as-meaningful world meaning meaningful representation critique model list:mind-body-world

Permalink

Intelligence in the meaningful

Intelligence abides in the meaningful. This is not to say that it is surrounded by or directed toward the meaningful, as if they were two separate phenomena, somehow related to one another. Rather, intelligence has its very existence in the meaningful as such—in something like the way a nation’s wealth lies in its productive capacity, or a corporation’s strength may consist in its market position. Of course, the meaningful, here, cannot be wholly passive and inert, but must include also activity and process. Intelligence, then, is nothing other than the overall interactive structure of meaningful behavior and objects. This is a view shared by scientists and philosophers, all the way from the most classical ai to its most radical critics—including, among others, Simon and Dreyfus. Why?

Perhaps the basic idea can be brought out this way. Intelligence is the ability to deal reliably with more than the present and the manifest. That’s surely not an adequate definition of intelligence, but it does get at something essential, and, in particular, something that has to do with meaning. For instance, representations—especially mental representations—are often taken as the archetype of the meaningful, and that wherein intelligence abides. The connection is straightforward. Representations are clearly an asset in coping with the absent and covert, insofar as they themselves are present, and “stand in for” something else—something absent—which they “represent”. This “standing in for” is their meaningfulness; and it is what makes intelligence possible.

—Haugeland, J., 2000: Mind Embodied and Embedded, p. 24. Chapter 9 in Haugeland, J., 2000: Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. Harvard University Press.

author:haugeland-john book:haugeland-having-thought paper:haugeland-mind-embodied-and-embedded snip:intelligence-in-the-meaningful intelligence meaning meaningful representation definition semiotics list:mind-body-world

Permalink

Specific complexity

the complexity of the nervous system is task specific, and in two different ways. In the first place, at any moment, the pulse patterns needed for typing an ‘A’ differ from those needed for typing a ‘B’, not to mention from those needed for writing a ‘B’. The skills in question just are the abilities to get these things done right. And getting them right—this letter as opposed to that one—depends in specific detail on the actual pulse patterns, in a way that it does not depend on any details of my immune defenses. Second, as I acquired these skills, various more or less permanent changes were made in my neural pathways, in implementing all the relevant habits and reflexes. (Dreyfus, remember, was discussing learning.) And these changes, likewise, were specific to the skills learned—in a way that, for example, increases in circulatory capacity wouldn’t have been.

—Haugeland, J., 2000: Mind Embodied and Embedded, p. 21. Chapter 9 in Haugeland, J., 2000: Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. Harvard University Press.

author:haugeland-john book:haugeland-having-thought paper:haugeland-mind-embodied-and-embedded snip:specific-complexity body muscular-gestalt output coordination complexity specificity list:mind-body-world

Permalink

Cryptography analogy for explaining non-separation of mind-body

Perhaps an analogy would help—even if it’s fairly far fetched. Imagine an encryption algorithm with the following three features: it uses very large encryption keys (tens of millions of bits, just for instance); cryptograms, even for quite brief messages, are comparable in size to the keys themselves; and it is tremendously redundant, in the sense that (for each key) countless distinct cryptograms would decode to the same message. Now, consider, for a given key and message, all the cryptograms that would decode to that message; and ask whether it could make any sense to speak of what these cryptograms have in common apart from that particular key. It’s hard to see how it could. Yet, if individual cryptograms have any meaning at all, then these must all have the same meaning; so either cryptograms are meaningless, or they mean something only in conjunction with a particular key. Then the analogy works like this: each individual’s particular body—his or her own muscular gestalts—functions like a large encryption key; and the pulse patterns coming down from the brain are the cryptograms, which are either meaningless, or they mean something only in conjunction with that particular body. Either way, they aren’t instructions. This is only an analogy, however, because the activity of the fingers should not be regarded as “decoding neural messages”, but rather as an integral part of the “processing” that the brain and other neurons also contribute to.

—Haugeland, J., 2000: Mind Embodied and Embedded, p. 20. Chapter 9 in Haugeland, J., 2000: Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. Harvard University Press.

author:haugeland-john book:haugeland-having-thought paper:haugeland-mind-embodied-and-embedded snip:cryptography-analogy body muscular-gestalt output coordination complexity specificity list:mind-body-world