Haugeland: Interrelationist critiques do not go far enough (presenting ‘intimacy’)
While undeniably important and compelling, [interrelationist] considerations like these seem to me seriously incomplete and potentially distorting. They remain theoretical or intellectual in a way that not only does not undermine but actually reinforces an aspect of the Cartesian separation that is still so pervasive as to be almost invisible. In particular, interrelationist accounts retain a principled distinction between the mental and the corporeal… The contrary of this separation…is not interrelationist holism, but something that I would like to call the intimacy of the mind’s embodiment and embeddedness in the world. The term ‘intimacy’ is meant to suggest more than just necessary interrelation or interdependence but a kind of commingling or integralness of mind, body, and world—that is, to undermine their very distinctness.
—Haugeland, J., 2000: Mind Embodied and Embedded, p. 2. Chapter 9 in Haugeland, J., 2000: Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. Harvard University Press.
author:haugeland-john book:haugeland-having-thought paper:haugeland-mind-embodied-and-embedded snip:interrelationism-is-not-enough-present-intimacy intimacy interrelationism cartesian-separation critique list:mind-body-world
